EDITOR'S CORNER: How to Stop Russia?

Peace in Ukraine doesn’t begin with Putin. What does that mean? It means peace can’t be negotiated with the current regime. The moment the war ends, Putin and his circle face the risk of collapse. 

In this blog post, we’ll explore the conditions under which Russia might actually come to the negotiating table and participate in good faith.

THE CURRENT STATE OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE

2025 has been a bad year for the Russians. Rising casualties with little gain, an increasing cost of war, and few meaningful victories have Putin chomping at the bit. He knows the population is becoming increasingly intolerant of the war.

We can't see this, of course. Public dissent is banned—a sentence that can earn you a one-way ticket to the front.

Still, the signs are there. Leaks from within the military, subtle shifts in propaganda, and growing signs of unrest in the regions all point to a regime under pressure. The war that was supposed to be quick and decisive has become a grinding, costly stalemate. And the longer it drags on, the more fragile Putin’s grip becomes.

WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO SURVIVE?

Putin needs the war machine to keep running in order to stay in power. The Russian economy has been reshaped into a wartime economy. This means that workers in the defense sector earn relatively good wages and enjoy a stable, even comfortable, standard of living. Soldiers on the front lines are offered high salaries and attractive sign-up bonuses. In some of Russia’s poorer regions, these incentives can be hard to turn down—making military service a tempting option for struggling families.

But the rest of the economy is suffering. Sectors unrelated to the war effort, like construction and consumer services, are stagnating. Pensioners are barely able to make ends meet, and inflation continues to erode real incomes.

Adding to the strain are constant Ukrainian drone and missile strikes on Russian oil refineries and infrastructure. These attacks punch holes in Russia’s energy revenues—one of its few remaining lifelines—and also disrupt civilian life. Airports in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and other major cities are regularly shut down due to air raid alerts. Flights are delayed or canceled, and the uncertainty has made everyday travel increasingly frustrating for ordinary Russians.

BACK TO USSR 

Putin has tightened his grip on society to counter dissent. While Russia’s restrictions have been growing since 2022, they now resemble USSR-style control. In July 2025, the Duma passed a new law criminalizing searching for online content deemed “extremist,” with penalties for knowingly seeking such material. 

This is the first time that simply performing a search—without sharing or distributing the content—has become a punishable offense.

Russian law defines “extremist materials” broadly, covering not just violent ideologies but also opposition groups like Navalny’s Anti-Corruption Foundation and entire social movements such as LGBTQ+ communities. Enforcement methods remain unclear, but authorities may rely on search engine logs, internet service provider data, or even random device checks to detect violations.

These measures follow earlier laws passed since the 2022 invasion, including criminal penalties for spreading so-called fake news or discrediting the military. Media freedom has been virtually eliminated, with total state control over national broadcasts and the shutdown of nearly all independent outlets.

The interesting question is how long will Russians take this, when they are used to freedoms that you and me have today? 

WHAT DOES IT TAKE TO STOP ALL OF THIS? 

Now that we have a clearer picture of the situation in Russia, the real question is: what's the solution?

A lasting peace deal in Ukraine requires a complete change in regime. But even if Putin is removed, there’s no guarantee that his replacement will take a different path. The power structure around him—the siloviki and inner circle—understand that their survival depends on maintaining the status quo.

The West must shift the calculus for Russia’s elite. The goal should be to make it more appealing for the siloviki and oligarchs to engage with the West than to cling to Putin. The regime needs to fracture from within, and any rebuilding must happen outside the shadow of Putin’s rule.

At the same time, Western leaders must make it clear that launching a wider war with Europe would carry unbearable costs. Peace needs to be framed as the better deal. Only then is there a chance for Russia to approach the table with genuine intent.

Trump, however, seems to take a different view. He insists on negotiating directly with Putin and appears willing to accommodate his demands—even as he pressures Ukraine to accept regime change.

This dynamic doesn’t exist in a vacuum. There are signs that China is preparing for potential conflict over Taiwan, possibly with Russian support. Beijing may pressure Moscow to open a diversionary front in Europe, forcing the United States to stretch its resources or abandon one theater. This scenario plays directly into Russian strategy.

Still, the risk of such escalation can be contained—by making continued aggression a losing proposition for both Russia and China. The question is: how do we do that?

SWEET DEALS, HARD CHOICES 

One potential lever the West can use is a targeted adjustment of sanctions—specifically aimed at creating incentives for the siloviki and oligarchs to break from Putin. Rather than blanket economic punishment, Western governments could offer conditional easing of individual sanctions for those who demonstrate a willingness to cooperate with international norms or support a post-Putin transition. These incentives might include access to frozen assets, travel freedoms, or limited re-entry into global markets—structured in a way that rewards behavior change rather than legitimizes the regime. 

In parallel, economic pressure on China could be fine-tuned to highlight the long-term costs of aligning with a collapsing Russia. Offering Beijing off-ramps—such as resumed trade benefits or joint climate and infrastructure initiatives—could weaken the appeal of military confrontation and foster a more pragmatic posture.

At the same time, Europe must dramatically reinforce its defensive posture to deter any escalation. This means increasing NATO troop deployments along the eastern flank, accelerating weapons production within the EU, and strengthening missile defense systems across key territories. 

Joint military exercises should be more frequent and visible, sending a clear signal of readiness. Investment in cyber defense, satellite surveillance, and hybrid warfare capabilities must also scale up to match the evolving threat landscape. The message must be unmistakable: any attempt to provoke a broader conflict will be met with overwhelming unity and force. By combining pressure with carefully calibrated incentives, the West can reshape the strategic landscape—and make peace more appealing than war.

CONCLUSION 

Peace won't come through Putin—it must come through shifting the power around him. By making it more rewarding for Russia’s elite to break with the regime, and costly for China to back aggression, the West can create real pressure for change.

At the same time, strengthening Europe’s defenses ensures any escalation is met with resolve. With smart leverage and clear deterrence, peace can become the better deal.