EDITOR'S CORNER: Renegade Nations Can’t Decide Europe’s Future
Today, let’s turn our attention to the $300 billion in frozen Russian state assets held across Europe and other Western countries—funds that should be redirected to support Ukraine, not returned to the Kremlin. These assets are currently protected under EU sanctions, which must be unanimously renewed by all 27 member states every six months. That includes Hungary and Slovakia—two countries whose leaders have recently taken troubling steps toward aligning with Moscow.
In this post, we’ll explore why the question of what to do with these funds has become more urgent than ever, as the war in Ukraine drags on and reconstruction needs continue to grow. Returning the assets to Russia would be nothing short of financing its next wave of aggression.
CAN THE EU HOLD THE LINE?
Up to now, the EU has managed to maintain consensus through a mix of creative diplomacy and behind-the-scenes pressure. But that fragile unity is increasingly under threat.
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán maintains close ties with Donald Trump and has frequently challenged EU foreign policy. Slovakia’s Robert Fico, for his part, recently disregarded Brussels by announcing his intent to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade on May 9th, in Moscow. This is an event most European leaders are avoiding due to Russia's aggressive and cruel attack on Ukraine.
These are not isolated gestures; they signal a deeper political drift that could jeopardize the bloc’s ability to act with one voice. If even one member breaks ranks, the sanctions regime could unravel—freeing up Russian assets that might soon be funneled back into its war machine.
The EU must now reckon with a pressing dilemma: how to prevent the return of these funds to Russia—and how to deal with member states that no longer seem committed to the shared values underpinning European unity.
WHY ARE HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA PLAYING HARDBALL?
Hungary has become a persistent thorn in the side of both the European Union and NATO. Despite being a member of both alliances, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has repeatedly acted at odds with their collective principles. Budapest has routinely blocked or delayed EU sanctions against Russia, obstructed Ukraine’s path toward EU membership, and openly criticized the Union itself.
More troublingly, Orbán has pushed a domestic agenda that often violates core EU values. His government has introduced legislation that restricts personal freedoms, targets minority groups, and limits freedom of expression—laws that many argue contravene the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Recently, reports emerged of a proposed bill that would revoke Hungarian citizenship from dual nationals who publicly criticize the regime—a chilling escalation in Orbán’s authoritarian drift.
The EU has found itself with few tools to curb Hungary’s defiance. Efforts to suspend or withhold EU funds have had limited impact. At times, Orbán has been excluded from key decisions entirely. During the most recent EU declaration of support for Ukraine, all 26 other member states signed on—Hungary was left out, a clear signal of its growing isolation within the bloc.
Slovakia, under Prime Minister Robert Fico since his return to power in 2023, appears to be following a similar trajectory. Fico has aligned his policies closely with Orbán’s and has made overtures toward Vladimir Putin, undermining the EU’s unified stance on Ukraine. He has appeared frequently in Russian media and publicly challenged EU guidance, including plans to attend Russia’s Victory Day parade—an act that directly contradicts the show of solidarity the rest of Europe has maintained with Ukraine.
Together, Hungary and Slovakia are testing the EU’s ability to remain cohesive in the face of war on its borders. As internal dissent grows louder, the challenge is not just about foreign policy—it’s about defending the very foundations of democratic Europe from within.
ARTICLE 7 OF THE EU
Faced with growing defiance from Hungary and, increasingly, Slovakia, the European Union must confront a difficult truth: its internal cohesion is being undermined not just by external threats like Russia, but from within its own ranks. When diplomatic persuasion and financial pressure fail, the EU’s most serious tool for dealing with rogue member states is Article 7.
Sometimes referred to as the "nuclear option", Article 7 allows the EU to suspend certain rights of a member state—most notably, its voting rights in the Council—if it is found to be in "serious and persistent breach" of the EU's foundational values, including democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
In 2018, the European Parliament triggered Article 7 proceedings against Hungary, citing systemic threats to the rule of law, judicial independence, and press freedom. However, the process has stalled due to the requirement for unanimity among the other member states—something Hungary and its allies, like Poland at the time, managed to block. Slovakia, under Robert Fico, has not yet been formally targeted under Article 7, but its recent trajectory raises red flags.
The European Union must urgently find a way to preserve the unity of its 27-member bloc. Without it, critical decisions—like the renewal of sanctions on frozen Russian assets—hang in the balance. These sanctions are set to expire in July unless unanimously extended. If that vote fails, and the sanctions lapse, the consequences could be catastrophic—not just for Ukraine, but for Europe’s security as a whole.
Orbán and Fico must come to terms with this reality. A war on the continent will affect Hungary and Slovakia too, whether they acknowledge it or not. As members of both the EU and NATO, they cannot stand on the sidelines unless they’re prepared to align fully with Moscow—an outcome that would almost certainly provoke political backlash at home.
To grasp what’s at stake, consider this: Russia’s military budget for 2024 is estimated at around $140 billion. If the $300–330 billion in frozen assets were returned, it could fund the Kremlin’s war machine for another two to two and a half years—money that would be used to rearm, replenish troops, and escalate its aggression. Already, Russia is reinforcing military positions near Finland, Estonia, and heavily arming Kaliningrad. Despite suffering heavy losses in Ukraine, the Russian military-industrial complex is shifting into high gear.
Russia’s economy is now fully adapted for wartime production. Propaganda and education systems are priming citizens—starting with children—for a long-term confrontation with the West. What we are witnessing is not just a war against Ukraine, but preparations for a broader conflict with NATO. And yet, NATO itself is not ready.
Europe’s militaries are, in many cases, dangerously hollow. While they may appear formidable on paper, the reality is stark: some countries could exhaust their munitions in less than two weeks of high-intensity warfare. Germany is facing significant weapons shortages. The UK is grappling with personnel deficits. France is relatively better positioned, thanks in part to its strategic independence since the era of Charles de Gaulle—but it, too, faces logistical and modernization challenges.
CONCLUSION
We cannot afford to give Russia a second wind—certainly not by unfreezing the very assets that could bankroll its next offensive. With the United States retreating into isolationism and Donald Trump openly embracing Vladimir Putin, the transatlantic alliance is no longer a certainty. Europe must come to terms with the possibility that it may soon have to defend itself—alone.
In this moment of geopolitical reckoning, the EU must stand firm: on sanctions, on shared values, and on the principle of collective security. To waver now would be to hand Moscow both a moral victory and a material one. And Europe cannot afford to lose on either front.
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