EDITOR'S CORNER: What Side is Hungary On?

Throughout the past few years, Hungary has continued to surprise us in the West with its choices. In fact, perhaps “surprise” is no longer the right word — it has become almost predictable that Prime Minister Orbán and his government will side with Russia over Europe. Normally, this wouldn’t be a major issue; every democratic nation has the right to choose its own allies. But Hungary’s position is different — it’s a long-standing member of both NATO and the European Union.

In this blog post, let’s take a closer look at Hungary’s stance in recent years and consider where the country might be heading. Can Hungary actually be expelled from NATO or the EU? These questions have been raised by several experts over the past few years, and they’re worth examining more closely.

A RELUCTANT NATO AND EU MEMBER STATE

Hungary joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in March 1999. It became a member of the European Union (EU) in May 2004. Both moves were seen at the time as historic milestones in Hungary’s post–Cold War transformation. After decades under Soviet influence, Hungarians overwhelmingly supported integration with Western institutions. They viewed NATO and EU membership as guarantees of security, democracy, and economic opportunity. Joining NATO symbolized a decisive break from the Warsaw Pact era, while EU accession was the culmination of years of political and economic reform aimed at aligning Hungary with European standards and values.

However, over the years, Hungary’s enthusiasm for both alliances has cooled under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s leadership. His government’s increasingly nationalist and Eurosceptic stance, coupled with close ties to Russia, has often put Budapest at odds with Brussels and its NATO allies. While Hungary continues to benefit from EU funding and NATO’s collective defense umbrella, its domestic policies and foreign alignments reveal a government that seems unenthusiastic to fully embrace the democratic and strategic principles these organizations stand for. This makes it, in many ways, a reluctant member of both.

SABOTAGE UNDER ANOTHER NAME

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, both NATO and the European Union have stood firmly in support of Kyiv. Nearly all member countries have contributed individually and collectively by sending weapons, funds, and humanitarian aid to help Ukraine defend itself. Everyone, that is, except Hungary and Slovakia. The latter, like Hungary, is a member of both NATO and the EU. Yet under the leadership of Prime Minister Robert Fico, Slovakia—alongside Viktor Orbán’s Hungary—has become an outlier within both the defense alliance and the European financial and political community.

The problem is that both Hungary and Slovakia have repeatedly obstructed joint decisions on providing funding for Ukraine or imposing new sanctions on Russia. This poses a serious challenge because both the EU and NATO operate largely by consensus, meaning that every member state must agree before collective action can be taken. As a result, a single dissenting voice can stall or weaken the bloc’s response at a critical time. In practice, this has allowed Budapest and Bratislava to leverage their veto power for domestic political gain, slowing aid packages and creating fractures within the Western alliance—fractures that Moscow has been quick to exploit.

To work around these obstacles, the EU has at times offered substantial financial incentives to Hungary or agreed to specific concessions in order to secure Viktor Orbán’s cooperation—or, in some cases, to ensure he simply abstains by leaving the room during key votes.

WHY STAY IN THE EU AND NATO?

Despite its frequent clashes with both NATO and the EU, Hungary has strong incentives to remain a member of these institutions. EU membership provides Hungary with access to substantial structural and cohesion funds, which support infrastructure projects, economic development, and social programs across the country. 

Similarly, NATO membership ensures Hungary’s security under the alliance’s collective defense umbrella, which is especially valuable given the ongoing war in Ukraine and regional security concerns. Leaving either organization would isolate Hungary politically, economically, and militarily, making the costs far greater than the benefits of pursuing a more independent foreign policy.

Orbán talks tough and cultivates a friendly image with Moscow, but when it comes to a real break with the West he hasn’t pushed Hungary out of its alliances. He knows that a formal split from NATO or the EU — and the isolation that would follow — would provoke intense domestic backlash and severe economic and security costs. So instead he keeps Hungary inside the institutions while routinely testing their limits and exploiting the political space membership still affords.

CAN'T WE JUST KICK THEM OUT?

Calls by some fed up member states to expel Hungary from the EU or NATO face serious legal and practical obstacles. Both organizations operate on treaties that grant full member states strong protections: the EU requires a member state to voluntarily withdraw (Article 50), while NATO has no formal mechanism to expel a country. Even in extreme cases of noncompliance or violation of shared principles, the most realistic measures are diplomatic pressure, suspension of certain EU funding, or political isolation within the alliance. In other words, while Hungary may act as a reluctant or even obstructive member, there is currently no legal pathway to remove it from either the EU or NATO.

However, the EU does have a legal tool to limit a member state’s influence without expelling it entirely. Under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, the Council can suspend certain rights of a member state — including its voting rights in the Council — if it is found to be in “serious and persistent” breach of the bloc’s fundamental values. While this does not remove the country from the EU, it can significantly reduce its ability to shape decisions. 

In practice, however, activating Article 7 is politically and legally challenging: it requires multiple steps, including unanimity among other member states to determine a breach, meaning allied governments can block or delay sanctions. As a result, it serves more as a tool of diplomatic pressure than an effective means of forcing compliance.

MY OPINION

Orbán poses a danger to both the EU and NATO. I’m not saying Hungary as a whole is a bad country — far from it. The problem lies with Orban and his government. This was not always the case: in his younger years, Viktor Orbán fought for democracy and freedom. That changed over time, and today his policies reflect a much closer alignment with Russia than with Europe or the principles of NATO.

I also believe that ordinary Hungarians should not be punished for the actions of their government, though one could argue they bear some responsibility for repeatedly electing him. The key is to keep a tight rein on Orbán: limit his participation where possible, apply diplomatic and financial pressure, and uphold EU and NATO standards in all dealings with Budapest. 

Meanwhile, there is hope that political change may come from within. Opposition figures like Peter Magyar, who is gaining popularity, could eventually challenge Orbán’s grip on power, offering Hungary a chance to re-align with its Western allies and restore credibility within the EU and NATO. In the meantime, vigilance, unity among member states, and strategic leverage are the best tools to ensure that one government cannot undermine institutions that hundreds of millions depend on for security, stability, and shared values.

CONCLUSION 

Viktor Orbán may test the patience of the EU and NATO, but Hungary itself remains a vital member. The challenge is clear: constrain his influence, uphold alliance rules, and support democratic alternatives at home. The future of Hungary in Europe depends not on removing the country, but on reclaiming it from a government that has strayed from the values it once championed.