EDITOR’S CORNER: Stop Underestimating Russia

Russia has employed some truly hair-raising tactics in its war against Ukraine. Compounding this, much of its equipment looks less suited for the battlefield and more at home in a museum. Together, these factors have turned Russia into something of a global military punchline. We’ve seen aging Soviet-era tanks that seem better suited for World War II, reports of horses and even camels being used to transport supplies, and soldiers disguising themselves as piles of rubble or trash in an attempt to evade Ukrainian drones.

In this blog post, I want to move past the mockery and examine a more serious question: despite these shortcomings, Russia remains a powerful and capable axis power. But just how capable is it, really? And could it realistically cope with a full-scale war against the West?

HOW DANGEROUS IS RUSSIA, REALLY?

For all the images that invite ridicule, it would be a serious mistake to confuse embarrassment with incapability. Take the much-mocked Russian “penguin” camouflage suits that recently circulated on social media: rather than concealing soldiers from Ukrainian drones, they make them more conspicuous and arguably more likely to be targeted. Despite such laughable missteps, Russia still possesses one of the largest armies in the world. 

It maintains a vast nuclear arsenal and an industrial base capable of sustaining a long, grinding war. It is also worth noting that Russia continues to prosecute the war in Ukraine without martial law and without full-scale mass mobilization. Russian military doctrine has never been elegant or precise; it relies heavily on mass, attrition, and a willingness to absorb enormous casualties, alongside brutal tactics directed at the civilian populations of invaded nations. These are methods that would be politically and morally unacceptable in Western or NATO countries. History has shown that Russia often appears weak, until it adapts. In Ukraine, it has adapted with notable speed, even in the face of staggering losses.

The more important question, then, is not whether Russia could win a war against the West, but how much damage it could inflict in the process. In a direct confrontation with NATO, Russia would likely struggle against superior Western airpower, intelligence dominance, and logistical capacity. NATO also enjoys broader technological and operational advantages. But Russia would not limit itself to a conventional fight. It can still pose a serious threat through asymmetric warfare, cyber operations, energy coercion, and the ever-present risk of nuclear escalation. In many ways, it is already employing these tools against the West through what is often described as hybrid influence or hybrid warfare. To truly understand Russia’s combat potential, we must look beyond the battlefield in Ukraine and ask a more unsettling question: what would Russia do when pushed to its limits? And what might Vladimir Putin do if he believed his own survival, or his grip on power, was at stake?

A screenshot of the Russian soldier dressed in the "penguin" camo. 

RED LINES AND LIMITS IN A WAR BETWEEN THE WEST AND RUSSIA

When we talk about a confrontation between Russia and the West, or Russia and NATO, there are several possible scenarios. First, why make a distinction between the West and NATO at all? Because Russia could very well choose to target a country outside of NATO, such as Moldova. In that case, Western countries would likely respond much as they have in Ukraine: providing money, weapons, and strong condemnation, but little direct intervention. 

However, if the target were a NATO country, such as Estonia, Finland, or Poland, then we are looking at two very different scenarios:

1. NATO comes to help: 
• If NATO functions as it is supposed to, and Article 5 is upheld in full, then Russia gains nothing strategically. It would cause damage and likely inflict mass casualties on both sides, but overall NATO is a far more capable force than Russia. NATO would enjoy air superiority, maritime superiority, integrated command structures, and overwhelming advantages in precision weapons and surveillance. Western intelligence capabilities are broader, deeper, and far more effective. In this scenario, Russia would likely have to mobilize the entire nation and declare martial law to sustain a conflict against the whole alliance. The only real card it could play would be nuclear escalation.
2. NATO does not help: 
• What happens then? For one, it would effectively mean the end of the alliance. This is the kind of scenario described in Carlo Masala’s book "If Russia Wins: A Scenario". Perhaps a small town in Estonia is invaded, or an island off the coast of Sweden or Finland is seized. NATO decides it is not worth triggering full Article 5 unity. Maybe the United States chooses not to get involved, seeing it as a localized European conflict. With NATO fragmented and hesitant, Russia suddenly has a real opportunity to cause chaos, and possibly to win. Even Finland, with its strong military culture, large reserves, and capable defense forces, would struggle to withstand a full-scale Russian attack on its own. Ukraine has been able to hold out largely because it fields a massive number of troops compared to the rest of Europe. The largest militaries in Europe after Ukraine are Türkiye and Poland, and even they are only about one-third the size of Ukraine’s forces.

No matter which scenario we consider, one thing is certain: Russia would never fight the West or NATO in a clean, purely conventional war. It would rely heavily on escalation management: cyberattacks, covert operations, sabotage, terrorist attacks, the use of migrants as a hybrid weapon, and the disruption or destruction of critical infrastructure. It would likely do just enough to provoke escalation, but not enough for its actions to be unmistakably labeled as war. All the while, it would continue the constant saber-rattling over its nuclear capabilities, reminding everyone that those options are always, supposedly, on the table.

SO, WHAT TO TAKE FROM THIS?

The lesson we need to take from all of this is that Russia cannot be underestimated. We can and should study what Russia is doing in Ukraine and learn from the tactics on display there. But we also have to understand that those tactics are shaped by a very specific context, at a very specific moment in time. A war with NATO would likely look very different. For one thing, drones might not play the same dominant role, especially in an environment saturated with advanced air defenses and electronic warfare. Instead, we would likely see far more air combat, with fighter jets and long-range strikes becoming central as both sides compete for air superiority.

In a war against NATO, Russia would almost certainly fight harder and dirtier. Its methods could become even more brutal, with a greater reliance on mass, attrition, and what can only be described as meat-grinder tactics. We would likely see more missiles launched, more drones employed, and heavier strikes overall. Civilian suffering could also be far greater, as Russia has repeatedly shown a willingness to escalate violence against population centers when facing a powerful adversary.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, Russia remains a formidable military power, even if its tactics in Ukraine often appear chaotic or outdated. Its massive army, nuclear arsenal, and willingness to adapt make it a threat that cannot be dismissed. While conventional forces may struggle against NATO’s technological and logistical advantages, Russia has repeatedly shown it can exploit asymmetrical strategies, cyberattacks, hybrid warfare, and escalation management to offset weaknesses. 

Any confrontation with the West would be complex, unpredictable, and likely far more brutal than what we see in Ukraine. The key lesson is clear: underestimating Russia is dangerous. Understanding its capabilities, motivations, and limits is essential to preparing for the scenarios, conventional or hybrid, that might lie ahead.